Tuesday, October 30, 2007
Mary Jane Jacob lecture in relation to Kwon
Miwon Kwon explains in One Place After Another: Site Specific Art and Locational Identity that "new genre public artists seek to engage (nonart) issues in the hearts and minds of the 'average man on the street' or 'real people' outside the art world. Mary Jane Jacob explained this concept in great detail in her lecture. She explained that museums acted as the 'middle man' between the artists and their audience and by taking these public art projects out of museums, the art is brought back into common life. Museums are intended to attract the upper class, making it more difficult for the 'common man' to be affected by art. They are also very much like institutionalized gatekeepers, when in reality the artist should be the only gatekeeper to his/her art. Jacob explained that John Dewey said that "art can have a consequence, but we must allow it do that." In other words, all art is produced for a purpose and by putting these art pieces in museums, only certain people are affected by it. New genre public art brings art back to the people and makes these projects just as much about public as they are art.
Analysis Project Ideas
Topic: the candy bar "designed and produced in collaboration with members of a candy-making union, by Simon Grennan, Christopher Sperandio, and the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers' International Union of American Local No. 552"
1. Do the in class readings have to be about the candy bar in specific or do they just have to address similar ideas that the candy bar project posesses?
2. What are you looking for specifically in the analysis?
Title: Bugs in the system {street art multiples}
Personal Author: Schwartzman, Allan
Journal Name: The Print Collector's Newsletter
Title: Forum: who should create public art
Personal Author: RAKONCAY, Arlene
Journal Name: American Artist
Title: Does the public want public sculpture?
Personal Author: HAWTHORNE, Don
Journal Name: Art News
Title: Private sector/public art {Washington, D.C; symposium}
Personal Author: Fleming, L.
Journal Name: Art News
1. Do the in class readings have to be about the candy bar in specific or do they just have to address similar ideas that the candy bar project posesses?
2. What are you looking for specifically in the analysis?
Title: Bugs in the system {street art multiples}
Personal Author: Schwartzman, Allan
Journal Name: The Print Collector's Newsletter
Title: Forum: who should create public art
Personal Author: RAKONCAY, Arlene
Journal Name: American Artist
Title: Does the public want public sculpture?
Personal Author: HAWTHORNE, Don
Journal Name: Art News
Title: Private sector/public art {Washington, D.C; symposium}
Personal Author: Fleming, L.
Journal Name: Art News
Sunday, October 21, 2007
This is not a pipe either.
The author in "This is not a pipe either" presents the idea that documentaries are a "narrative guilding...the interpretation of the images must flow along a unilinear pathway, at such a speed that the viewer has no time for any reflection." This is a complete contrasting view of Sontag because Sontag talks about leaving the artwork open for interpretation. The article goes on to talk about how documentaries have a predetermined course and does not encourage free thought and ideas, similar to conservative politics. Helms' overall strategy was to "create the preconditions for the public to blindly follow into self-censorship, thereby agreeing to the homogenous order desired by the elite class.
http://www.filmreference.com/images/sjff_01_img0061.jpg
http://www.filmreference.com/images/sjff_01_img0061.jpg
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Environmental Justic in Onondaga County Revision
The Superfund Program is a superb example of a government program gone awry. The program's original intention to better the environment has now been replaced by the corrupt political, social, and monetary intentions of self-interested individuals. A Christian Science Monitor article, "Superfund Program: A Smaller Cleanup Rag" was released into the public on November 14, 2003. The article outlines the pros and cons of a federal cleanup program, known as Superfund. Superfund was put into effect in 1980 to enable the cleanup of hazardous wastes that filled our streams, lakes, and air, threatening not only the environment, but the health of many living near these toxic sites. Each year the government has given $1 billion to carry out necessary actions to cleanup each particular site, and the program has succeeded in cleaning up 866 sites thus far. Now Congress has failed to reinstate Superfund's budget since 1995 and they are ultimately bankrupt. So the problem prevails, who is going to pay for the remaining sites that still are a health threat?
There are two solutions, make the "polluter pay," or make the taxpayers foot the bill. The "polluter pay" principle usually involves the Environmental Protection Agency trying to "hunt down one or two deep-pocket corporations that can somehow be linked to the site and then hits them with the full cost of cleanup" (Knickerbocker 2). This principle results in many excess fees due to the need for a lawyer and private investigators, draining the Superfund's resources for unnecessary rationales. Forcing the taxpayers to pay is becoming by increasing numbers, the solution. In fact, Superfund has grown to become 58 percent of the taxpayers’ responsibility, up from 18 percent.
Superfund's dilemma has caused these waste sites to remain worthless areas of the community because urban developers are hesitant to purchase land in fear that they will remain responsible for the land's past history. In the end it is most likely that American taxpayers will remain responsible for the irresponsible actions of large corporations, a typicality of this country.
The four and a half mile long, one mile wide, Onondaga Lake was added to Superfund’s list of contaminated waste sites in 1994 due to the “2.65 million cubic yards of mercury-contaminated sediments at lake depths ranging up to 30 feet” (Urbina 1). Honeywell International was ordered to begin a seven year process beginning in 2005 of dredging to remove 165,000 pounds of mercury and other toxins that were dumped into the lake when Honeywell merged with Allied Chemical before it closed in 1988. Despite the fact that the lake measures over 2 million cubic yards, it is proposed that Honeywell only dredges a mere 508,000 cubic yards. The intention is to cap the remaining area of the lake with sand and gravel, which is a temporary, short-term solution (Urbina 1). Onondaga Lake is just one example of hundreds that Superfund attempts to fix in a quick, cheap, meager way.
The Superfund program has remained unfair, resulting in little success and popularity. During the first twelve years, 156 sites reached the construction complete phase compared with 541 sites from 1993 to 1999 (Daley and Layton 376). The dramatic difference in numbers sparks many questions, like why are some sites a higher priority? What causes some sites to be cleaned up faster and more efficiently compared to others? The answer lies in many aspects of financial, political, and social limitations.
The Policy Studies Journal has theorized three possible hypothesizes, all of which have been tested based on independent variables, including hazardous ranking score, estimated cost, number of responsible parties, population density, appearance of an active community group, home ownership, income, and region. The dependent variable is based on the time the particular site was listed on the National Priority List.
After many mathematical equations were applied to test results and the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables was determined, The Administrative Convenience/Transaction Costs Model proved itself in many ways. This “assumes that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals who seek to attain their goals rationally” (Daley and Layton 377). The results showed that the easier sites were taken care of before the worst, based on a hazardous ranking score ranging from 28.5 to 100, representing “the sites’ potential human and ecological health risk” (Daley and Layton 381). Bureaucrats pursue sites that are cheaper and more convenient to handle. When more parties are responsible and more community groups involved, the process is more difficult, and ultimately put on hold. Bureaucrats then move on to easier sites to make a faster dollar. This approach is completely contradictory to Superfund’s original purpose: to improve the quality of life for individuals living near a potentially dangerous toxic waste site that can hinder health problems, including birth defects, cancer, and changes in neuro-behavioral functions (Daley and Layton 375). As Daley and Layton explain, some could argue that this approach is efficient and strategic. Despite that some may believe this approach to be efficient, only 677 of 1,235 sites have reached the construction completion phase since the early 1990s (Daley and Layton 380), leaving the most problematic sites untouched.
Not only are the aforementioned financial and social variables unfair, it is also proven that there is much political pressure involved as well. The Policy Studies Journal states that, “Sites are systematically more likely to reach construction completion when an elected official from the site’s congressional district sits on a Superfund oversight committee.”
It is clear that Superfund is a program motivated and controlled by political, social, and monetary means. A program that is intended to help better the environment and improve peoples’ quality of life, ends up hurting the people even more because when Superfund reaches the end of their funds, the taxpayers will be using their own personal resources to correct the problem caused by someone else. Superfund is inefficient in all aspects, from debate over who foots the bill to what site will be tackled next. Then, when a site is finally considered, it is likely that an cheaper, impermanent solution is applied to correct the problem. Onondaga Lake is just one example of a hazardous site is still in the process of being remediated. The "limited cleanup approach" (Urbina 1) will cost a total $237 million compared with $2.33 billion for a complete remediation, involving "dredging and placing a permanent cap across the entire 2, 329 acres of the lake bottom" (Ubrina 2).
There are two solutions, make the "polluter pay," or make the taxpayers foot the bill. The "polluter pay" principle usually involves the Environmental Protection Agency trying to "hunt down one or two deep-pocket corporations that can somehow be linked to the site and then hits them with the full cost of cleanup" (Knickerbocker 2). This principle results in many excess fees due to the need for a lawyer and private investigators, draining the Superfund's resources for unnecessary rationales. Forcing the taxpayers to pay is becoming by increasing numbers, the solution. In fact, Superfund has grown to become 58 percent of the taxpayers’ responsibility, up from 18 percent.
Superfund's dilemma has caused these waste sites to remain worthless areas of the community because urban developers are hesitant to purchase land in fear that they will remain responsible for the land's past history. In the end it is most likely that American taxpayers will remain responsible for the irresponsible actions of large corporations, a typicality of this country.
The four and a half mile long, one mile wide, Onondaga Lake was added to Superfund’s list of contaminated waste sites in 1994 due to the “2.65 million cubic yards of mercury-contaminated sediments at lake depths ranging up to 30 feet” (Urbina 1). Honeywell International was ordered to begin a seven year process beginning in 2005 of dredging to remove 165,000 pounds of mercury and other toxins that were dumped into the lake when Honeywell merged with Allied Chemical before it closed in 1988. Despite the fact that the lake measures over 2 million cubic yards, it is proposed that Honeywell only dredges a mere 508,000 cubic yards. The intention is to cap the remaining area of the lake with sand and gravel, which is a temporary, short-term solution (Urbina 1). Onondaga Lake is just one example of hundreds that Superfund attempts to fix in a quick, cheap, meager way.
The Superfund program has remained unfair, resulting in little success and popularity. During the first twelve years, 156 sites reached the construction complete phase compared with 541 sites from 1993 to 1999 (Daley and Layton 376). The dramatic difference in numbers sparks many questions, like why are some sites a higher priority? What causes some sites to be cleaned up faster and more efficiently compared to others? The answer lies in many aspects of financial, political, and social limitations.
The Policy Studies Journal has theorized three possible hypothesizes, all of which have been tested based on independent variables, including hazardous ranking score, estimated cost, number of responsible parties, population density, appearance of an active community group, home ownership, income, and region. The dependent variable is based on the time the particular site was listed on the National Priority List.
After many mathematical equations were applied to test results and the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables was determined, The Administrative Convenience/Transaction Costs Model proved itself in many ways. This “assumes that bureaucrats are self-interested individuals who seek to attain their goals rationally” (Daley and Layton 377). The results showed that the easier sites were taken care of before the worst, based on a hazardous ranking score ranging from 28.5 to 100, representing “the sites’ potential human and ecological health risk” (Daley and Layton 381). Bureaucrats pursue sites that are cheaper and more convenient to handle. When more parties are responsible and more community groups involved, the process is more difficult, and ultimately put on hold. Bureaucrats then move on to easier sites to make a faster dollar. This approach is completely contradictory to Superfund’s original purpose: to improve the quality of life for individuals living near a potentially dangerous toxic waste site that can hinder health problems, including birth defects, cancer, and changes in neuro-behavioral functions (Daley and Layton 375). As Daley and Layton explain, some could argue that this approach is efficient and strategic. Despite that some may believe this approach to be efficient, only 677 of 1,235 sites have reached the construction completion phase since the early 1990s (Daley and Layton 380), leaving the most problematic sites untouched.
Not only are the aforementioned financial and social variables unfair, it is also proven that there is much political pressure involved as well. The Policy Studies Journal states that, “Sites are systematically more likely to reach construction completion when an elected official from the site’s congressional district sits on a Superfund oversight committee.”
It is clear that Superfund is a program motivated and controlled by political, social, and monetary means. A program that is intended to help better the environment and improve peoples’ quality of life, ends up hurting the people even more because when Superfund reaches the end of their funds, the taxpayers will be using their own personal resources to correct the problem caused by someone else. Superfund is inefficient in all aspects, from debate over who foots the bill to what site will be tackled next. Then, when a site is finally considered, it is likely that an cheaper, impermanent solution is applied to correct the problem. Onondaga Lake is just one example of a hazardous site is still in the process of being remediated. The "limited cleanup approach" (Urbina 1) will cost a total $237 million compared with $2.33 billion for a complete remediation, involving "dredging and placing a permanent cap across the entire 2, 329 acres of the lake bottom" (Ubrina 2).
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Tuesday, October 2, 2007
Superfund
A Christian Science Monitor article, "Superfund Program: A Smaller Cleanup Rag" was released into the public on November 14, 2003. The article outlines the pros and cons of a federal cleanup program, known as Superfund. Superfund was put into effect in 1980 to enable the cleanup of hazardous wastes that filled our streams, lakes, and air, threatening not only the environment itself, but the health of many living near these toxic sites. Each year the government has dished out $1 billion to carry out necessary actions to cleanup each particular site, and the program has succeeded in cleaning up 866 sites thus far. Now Congress has failed to reinstate Superfund's budget since 1995 and they are ultimately bankrupt. So the problem prevails, who is going to pay for the remaining sites that still are a health threat?
There are basically two solutions, make the "polluter pay," or make the taxpayers foot the bill. The "polluter pay" principle usually involves the Environmental Protection Agency trying to "hunt down one or two deep-pocket corporations that can somehow be linked to the site and then hits them with the full cost of cleanup." This principle results in many excess fees due to the need for lawyer and private investigators, draining the Superfund's funds for unnecessary reasons. Forcing the taxpayers to pay is becoming by increasing numbers, the solution. In fact, Superfund has grown to become 58 percent of the taxpayers responsibility, up from 18 percent.
Superfund's dilemma has caused these waste sites to remain worthless areas of the community because urban developers are hesitant to purchase land in fear that they will remain responsible for the land's past history. In the end it is most likely that American taxpayers will remain responsible for the irresponsible actions of large corporations, a typicality of the this country.
There are basically two solutions, make the "polluter pay," or make the taxpayers foot the bill. The "polluter pay" principle usually involves the Environmental Protection Agency trying to "hunt down one or two deep-pocket corporations that can somehow be linked to the site and then hits them with the full cost of cleanup." This principle results in many excess fees due to the need for lawyer and private investigators, draining the Superfund's funds for unnecessary reasons. Forcing the taxpayers to pay is becoming by increasing numbers, the solution. In fact, Superfund has grown to become 58 percent of the taxpayers responsibility, up from 18 percent.
Superfund's dilemma has caused these waste sites to remain worthless areas of the community because urban developers are hesitant to purchase land in fear that they will remain responsible for the land's past history. In the end it is most likely that American taxpayers will remain responsible for the irresponsible actions of large corporations, a typicality of the this country.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)